Sunday, April 11, 2010

Thinking about free-will again...

I believe strongly that free-will is a concept that is important for Christians to embrace. Determinism is sort of old hat and Christians do not need to align themselves with a philosophy that is out of style unnecessarily. Under Christian theism the concept of divine foreknowledge is a deciding factor for many to place themselves in the determinist camp. The argument may run something like this:
  • God has perfect knowledge of all things past, present, and future.
  • Any object of knowledge that God possesses is necessarily true.
  • God has perfect knowledge of my writing this blog post prior (either logically or chronologically) to its actual occurrence.
  • If God possesses knowledge of any actual event there is no way that it could not occur because it would render God's perfect knowledge false.
  • Therefore, if God possesses knowledge of my writing this blog post prior to its actual occurrence then there is no way that it could not have occurred.
  • If it is not possible for events to occur other than they do by our own choosing, then there is no such thing as free-will.
  • It is not possible for events to occur other than they do because God has perfect knowledge of them.
  • Therefore, there is no such thing as free-will.

To me, although poorly put, this seems like strong case that has been made. However, many offer what has been named the Simple Foreknowledge view. In this view, God knows what is happening because he sees it happening. His knowledge of events no more causes them to occur than my seeing someone in a chair causes them to be, in fact, sitting in a chair.

At first glance this view seems appealing: (1) We preserve God's foreknowledge of future events, thereby protecting his sovereignty. (2) We protect human notions of freedom. However, I find the Simple Foreknowledge view to be inadequate; the Simple Foreknowledge view makes God's knowledge of events contingent upon their happening. This seems problematic to me. I think you may run into problems with God growing in knowledge as he creates the world. This is not to say that he grows in respect to what is possible but only in respect to what is actual. He did not know what would be actual prior to his actually instantiating it.

I would like to propose what I see as a better alternative. As I see it, the main problems associated with these two views is the emphasis upon God's knowledge. Knowledge is not causal, nor does God posses knowledge that is contingent upon events actually occurring. Here is my view: while His knowledge is not causal, God possesses knowledge of everything that ever could be and will be. He knows this in virtue of his having perfect knowledge of everything.

Going back to the first argument, could things be otherwise? My answer would be, yes. God perfectly knows all of our free acts. Thus God knows what actually is and what will be, but it could happen otherwise if we choose otherwise. I believe this view protects God's omniscience and sovereignty while also protecting human agency.

6 comments:

  1. So, He sees all the different paths that we COULD take, but He does not know which one we will actually take?

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  2. So in other words, you deny Prop 4 and the Conclusions that follow from it:

    "If God possesses knowledge of any actual event there is no way that it could not occur because it would render God's perfect knowledge false."

    You may want to change what you said in the last paragraph though, to reflect your position better. I was confused until I decided that you really meant (from sentence two, final paragraph): "God perfectly knows all of our POSSIBLE free acts."

    At least I think that's what you're going for here. If it is we have a problem. Isn't there a contradiction between separate outcomes if God knows all the possible outcomes? That is to say, if God's knowing an outcome precludes its non-instantiation, how can He know all possible outcomes when some outcomes are contradictory?

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  3. I suppose my view is just a modification of simple foreknowledge. God knows what will actually happen, that knowledge is not contigent upon it's happening (i.e. God's knowledge is not caused by the instansiation of events). I'm not sure how this would exclude the option of real possible outcomes. All it would do is state that possible outcomes are not instansiated.

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  4. So there's no difference in God's knowledge between an instantiated act and an uninstantiated act? Hmmm... [but] isn't instantiation a property of the act? So it sounds like He doesn't really know the act then. At least not fully.

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  5. If God's knowledge of what is instantiated is part of his essence, i.e. omniscience, then I really don't understand why there is no difference between knowledge of an instantiated act and an uninstantiated one.

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  6. There is a problem with your idea which I think I mentioned in e-mail but will mention in the clear light of a blog comment now that I know how to comment on this blog: if God's knowledge of X is part of God's essence, then X is true in every possible world (i.e. X is logically necessary). So far from saving free will your understanding of omniscience would destroy free will. The reason I think so is because:

    1. God exists in every possible world.

    (This is controversial but I know you agree).

    2. God's essence is the same in every possible world.

    (This follows from my understanding of "essence." An essence of a thing is what makes that thing itself and not something else. So if 2 were false then 1 would be false also, since in whichever possible worlds God's essence was different, he wouldn't really be God but something else, God minus, say.)

    3. God's knowledge of X is part of God's essence. (Your position).

    4. If (insert 1),(insert 2) and (insert 3) then God knows X in every possible world.

    5. But if God knows X in every possible world, then X is true in every possible world.

    Hence X is logically necessary and cannot be a free choice/act/radical.

    Personally I see no problem with believing that God's knowledge of events is contingent upon their happening, in fact I think it is logically necessary given the traditional view of knowledge (to know something it must be true) the correspondence theory of truth (for a proposition to be true it must correspond to what actually happens), and the traditional understanding of the universe as being contingent rather than necessary. The distinction between God's "essential" and "free" knowledge is an old one, and therefore probably accurate.

    Also, as Saint Tom says, premise two of your argument is false. While it is true that:

    "Necessarily, any object of God's knowledge is true."

    There is no reason to believe that:

    "Any object of God's knowledge is necessarily true."

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