Thoughts on Determinism

Are deterministic positions consistent with theistic beliefs? For the Christian it is very easy for them to agree that both God and evil exist. The problem of evil as understood to be a logical contradiction between the existence of evil and the existence of a perfectly powerful and a perfectly good God was single-handedly crushed by Alvin Plantinga. The problem of evil is no longer considered to carry the weight that it once did; the problem of evil is now a probabilistic argument that claims the existence of too much evil points to the non-existence of a perfectly good and perfectly powerful God.

Onward to the point! Some questions: Is the problem of evil suddenly a logical problem again if free will is impossible? Does the existence of determinism and God imply a logical contradiction? Orthodox Christianity believes that God cannot be the cause of evil but many Christians believe that determinism is true.

I think before I present my argument I should define what I mean by free-will and determinism.

Free will: the choice of an agent is not predetermined (i.e. a necessary between a cause and its effect in a chain of events) by any environmental or biological factors; the choice is an act of the will where the will is akin to a first mover. Ultimately the agent is the cause of his own actions not events and circumstances outside of him.

Determinism in a theistic sense: Under determinism everything that exists is the result of a cause and effect chain of events that God is in complete control of. Nothing exists without being caused by God.

Here is my argument for the existence of free will and against determinism because of the existence of evil:

(1) If evil exists then evil must have a cause for its existence (premise)

(2) God cannot be the cause of evil (premise)

(3) Evil exists (premise)

(4) Evil must have a cause for its existence (from 1 & 3 by MP)

(5) If evil must have a cause for its existence and God cannot be the cause of evil then evil must have a cause for its existence other than God (from 4 & 2)

(6) Evil must have a cause for its existence other than God. (from 4 & 2 by MP)

(7) If something must have a cause for its existence other than God then free will exists (premise)

(8) Evil is something

(9) Free will exists (from 6, 7, & 8)

This argument does not contradict certain notions of compatibilism. Assuming the argument is correct, I think that its conclusion is incompatible with desire theories of comatibilism.

I order to not make this post huge I am only going to present some potential objections to my argument rather than defend its claims:

In what do way do we mean that evil exists? Is evil really something? What is the ontological status of evil?

Can this argument be used against notions of the existence of God if free will is impossible?